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CHAPTER 14 
Consumer Law 
WILLIAM F. WILLIER* AND TERRANCE J. HAMIL TON** 
§14.1. Consumer credit practices and charges. In spite of the 
most extensive laws in the United States regulating consumer credit, 
some Massachusetts creditors continue to seek, and ostensibly find, 
loopholes which allow them to obtain a greater return for the exten-
sion of credit than the legislature had intended. Several statutory 
enactments have closed some of those loopholes, however. 
Multiple agreements. Because ceilings on finance charges in retail sale 
agreements are graduated, with higher charges allowed on lower un-
paid balances, it is possible for a credit seller to obtain greater finance 
charges by splitting a single transaction into several transactions of 
smaller amounts. Thus a buyer or a buyer in combination with his or 
her spouse might be induced to enter into several such transactions. 
Chapter 127 of the Acts of 1974, amending section 11 of chapter 
255D of the General Laws, forbids such a practice. 1 
"Flipped" installment sales. Installment sellers of "big ticket items" 
such as appliances do not have the capital to sustain cumulative credit 
sales. They sell their retail installment sale agreements to financing in-
stitutions such as sales finance companies or banks, which in turn col-
lect directly from the buyers. Not infrequently, such financing institu-
tions will hold more than one retail installment sale agreement en-
tered into by the same buyer. The financing institution is then in a 
position to induce the buyer to take credit in the form of a loan, pay-
ing off the unpaid balance of the installment sale agreement or a-
greements and often augmenting the debt with a cash loan. Thus the 
buyer was "flipped" from an installment sale with a maximum rate 
*WILLIAM F. WILLIER is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and Chair-
man of the Massachusetts Consumers' Council. 
**TERRANCE J. HAMIL TON is Counsel to the Massachusetts Consumers' Council. 
§14.1. 1 Chapter 127 added new § ll(D) to G.L. c. 2550, which reads: "No install-
ment seller shall permit any person, or any husband and wife jointly or severally, to be 
obligated, either directly or contingently to said seller, under more than one retail in-
stallment sales agreement executed at the same time." 
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ceiling of 24 or less per cent to a small loan with a maximum ceiling 
of 30 per cent. 2 
Chapter 137 of the Acts of 1974 in effect prohibits "flipping."3 Fi-
nancial institutions acquiring retail installment sale agreements are re-
stricted to the same procedures for refinancing, consolidation or ex-
tensions as the original seller would be, limiting the charges for credit 
to those for retail installment sales. An installment buyer thus cannot 
be "flipped" into a loan transaction by the holder of a retail sale a-
greement. The Act does not prohibit a completely separate financial 
institution from extending credit to a buyer, the proceeds of which he 
may use to pay off the unpaid balance of one or more retail install-
ment sale agreements, as long as the lender is not the holder of such 
agreements. 
Merchandise certificates. "Merchandise certificates" probably had their 
origin in the company stores of the late 19th century and early 20th 
century. Employees were paid, rather than in cash, in "scrip," which 
could be used to acquire goods in stores owned and operated by the 
employers. In current use, "merchandise certificates" constitute the 
poor person's means of obtaining credit. The credit manager of a re-
tailer determines that a credit applicant is worthy of some credit risk, 
but not much, and that the amount of credit must be limited and its 
use controlled. The attitude is paternalistic and reflects an inability to 
predict with any degree of accuracy the applicant's likelihood of pay-
ment. The applicant is granted a certain amount of credit plus fi-
nance charge which he or she promises to pay in installments over a 
period of time. The applicant is given some pieces of paper with 
monetary denominations totalling the amount of credit extended to 
be used in lieu of cash in making purchases. The installment pay-
ments must be made even if these "merchandise certificates" are 
never used in making purchases. The retailer collects the finance 
charge even though no credit is ever used or the credit used is far less 
than the finance charge paid. 
In contrast, consumer buyers fortunate enough to have department 
store credit cards make payments only in accordance with purchases 
actually made and pay finance charges only for the period the credit 
is used and the outstanding balance. Indeed, they frequently are 
given a "free period" in which to pay without any finance charge. 
Consumer buyers relegated to the use of "merchandise· certificates" 
are not as fortunate. Had such certificates not been included in the 
definition of "goods" in the original enactment of chapter 255D,4 al-
2 Such procedures have been severely restricted in Maine. See Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Tit. 9-A §§ 2.301 et seq., 3.404 (1964); Maine Consumer Credit Code§§ 2.301, 3.404. 
3 Acts of 1974, c. 137, § 2, adding G.L. c. 255D, § 18A. 
4 G.L. c. 255D, § 1. 
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lowing their "sale" as if they were a television set, their use by retailers 
in the manner described probably would have been illegal. 5 
In a half-hearted attempt to remedy the discrepancy between mer-
chandise certificates and credit cards, the General Court enacted 
chapter 924 of the Acts of 1973. Rather than placing merchandise 
certificates within the purview of a "revolving credit agreement," they 
were given a definition separate from that of "goods,"6 and their is-
suance pursuant to a retail installment sale agreement as in the past 
was thus sanctioned. However, the buyer is given the explicit right to 
return the coupons at any time for full credit, including finance 
charge and insurance. The buyer must be informed of such right on 
the agreement and on any newly-issued certificates and wrappers con-
taining them. Arguably, this right always existed. While not expressly 
stated in chapter 924, credit for finance charge upon surrender will 
no doubt be in accordance with the rule of 78's, as with prepayment 
of any retail installment sale agreement. 7 This, of course, ignores 
whether or when any of the certificates were actually used to purchase 
goods and hence obtain credit. 
Chapter 924 of the Acts of 1973 also amends chapter 255D of the 
General Laws to extract "gift certificates" from the definition of "mer-
chandise certificates" and place the former within the definition of 
"goods."8 The only real effect of this is to remove "gift certificates" 
from the provisions allowing return and credit. 
Some retailers do issue merchandise certificates to their regular re-
volving charge account customers, usually for specific purposes and 
with special privileges. For example, they may be issued late in the 
year for use to purchase holiday gifts with no payments due or fi-
nance charge accruing until the following February. The amendments 
to chapter 255D embodied in chapter 924 of the Acts of 1973 ex-
5 Although merchandise certificates were included in the original definition of 
"goods", a court could still have found them illegal. In W.T. Grant v. Walsh, 100 N.J. 
Super. 60, 241 A.2d 47 (Middlesex Cty. Dist. Ct. 1968), a New Jersey district court held 
that treating "merchandise certificates" as a closed end transaction and computing fi-
nance charge without reference to when the certificates were actually used, and hence 
credit extended, created a usurious rate of finance charge under New Jersey's Retail 
Installment Sales Act, N.J.S.A. l7:16C-4l. Id. at 63-64, 241 A.2d at 48. Of course, 
"merchandise certificates" are not included within the definition of "goods" in the New 
Jersey Act. Under Massachusetts law, however, "merchandise certificates" are treated as 
the equivalent of credit cards. See G.L. c. 255, § l2E, which deals with liability for lost 
or stolen credit cards, and which would give a Massachusetts court a basis for disallow-
ing the current method of computing the finance charge on them. In any event, it is 
illogical to treat pieces of paper such as merchandise certificates as equivalent to goods. 
6 A "merchandise certificate" is defined as: " ... a writing issued by a seller, not re-
deemable in cash and usable in its face amount in lieu of cash in exchange for goods or 
services supplied by the seller .... " Acts of 1973, c. 924, § 2. 
7 See G.L. c. 255D, § 13. 
8 Acts of 1973, c. 924, § I. 
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pressly accommodate this procedure.9 Its purpose, of course, is to in-
duce more purchases by the customer rather than to control the 
amount of credit, the usual reason for issuing merchandise certifi-
cates. 
Set-iff The traditional common law concept of the relationship be-
tween a savings or checking account depositor and the depositary 
bank is that of creditor and debtor. The identity of funds deposited 
becomes lost and the bank in effect owes that money to the depositor 
upon whatever terms accompany the particular account. Several pro-
visions of chapter 106 of the General Laws, the Uniform Commercial 
Code, embody this concept.10 It is not unusual that the bank at the 
same time extends credit to the depositor by separate credit transac-
tions such as installment loans, overdraft credit privileges, and credit 
cards issued by the bank. 
Another common law concept is that of "set-off," under which a 
debtor can charge against what he owes a creditor the amount the 
creditor in turn owes him by other obligations. Thus, where a holder 
of a credit card issued by a bank is also a depositor in the bank, the 
bank arguably has been able to charge off what the depositor owes on 
the credit card against what the depositor has in the various accounts 
in the bank. This is not, of course, a privilege enjoyed by creditors in 
other kinds of transactions, such as revolving charge accounts with re-
tail sellers, loans from small loan companies, or credit card transac-
tions where the cards are issued by parties or institutions not having 
depositary facilities. In spite of section 12F of chapter 255 of the 
General Laws, which allows the holder and user of a credit card to as-
sert against the issuer of a card defenses otherwise available against 
the merchant honoring it, banks have been free to ignore such dis-
putes and to exercise their right of set-off as a collection device, leav-
ing the holder-user to fight it out with the merchant. A holder-
depositor whose savings or checking account has been depleted 
through set-off by the bank is less likely to assert his defenses against 
the bank. 
To remedy this, the General Court enacted chapter 556 of the Acts 
of 197 4, which provides that set-off is not permitted unless a credit 
card holder has previously signed a separate agreement permitting 
set-off against a deposit account with the bank. Such an agreement, if 
proffered to a potential credit card holder, must contain conspicu-
ously a notice to the effect that signing the agreement is not a condi-
tion to obtaining the credit card. The Act, adding a new section 6C to 
chapter 140C of the General Laws, allows the card holder even to 
"suspend" such an agreement where a claim is disputed, denying the 
9 Id. § 4. 
to G.L. c. 106, §§ 2-717,4-201,4-212. 
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bank the right to apply funds from a deposit account. This does not 
interfere with arrangements whereby the depositor-card holder wishes 
to have his debts to the bank paid periodically from his account, as 
long as his authorization is open and above board. In credit card 
transactions, set-off is no longer the bank's right as a matter of law. 
Presumably, however, the right of set-off continues to exist in the case 
of any other obligations of a depositor due to the bank. The General 
Court would have been wise to encompass all such obligations within 
the purview of the statute, especially in view of the forthcoming pa-
perless transfers of money whereby accounts can be immediately deb-
ited for debts due not only to the bank but to third parties. De-
positors' existing rights in such cases, such as the right to stop pay-
ment on checks or to assert defenses, must be preserved. 
Finance charge computation. Holders of bank credit cards may obtain 
credit using such cards in two ways: by obtaining goods or services 
from merchants who will honor such credit cards, and by obtaining 
bank loans directly from the bank issuing the credit card. In 1972 the 
General Court put ceilings on the finance charges banks could exact 
by use of credit cards: 18 per cent on the first $500 of unpaid balance 
and 12 per cent on the unpaid balance exceeding $500.U In addition, 
the law fixed the methods by which finance charge could be com-
puted on periodic unpaid balances. Creditors were given two options: 
(1) the adjusted balance, meaning the balance at the beginning of a 
billing period minus payments and credits received during the billing 
period, or (2) the average daily balance during the billing period. 12 
Prior to this some banks had been computing finance charge on the 
previous balance without taking into account payments and credits. At 
least one bank in the Commonwealth has determined that the pre-
scribed methods of computation did not apply to cash advances and 
continued to compute the finance charge on the previous balance of 
such advances without deducting payments and credits. Whether or 
not the law could be so construed, this was obviously not the intent of 
the legislature. To make that intent clear, chapter 13 of the Acts of 
197 4 amended section 114B of chapter 140 of the General Laws to 
leave no doubt that the computational methods applied to all transac-
tions using credit cards and other open-end kinds of credit. 
§14.2. Truth-in-Lending Act: Amendments. The federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act! allows states, upon application to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to be exempt 
from application of the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act2 insofar as it 
11 G.L. c. 255D, § 11B(1), (2). 
12 Acts of 1972, c. 783, § 1, codified as G.L. c. 140, § ll4B. 
§14.2. 1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970). 
2 Id. §§ 1601-65. 
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would otherwise apply to state-chartered and regulated financial 
institutions.3 To obtain exemption, a state must have a law imposing 
"requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this chap-
ter" and providing for adequate enforcement. 4 
Massachusetts, the first state to have a Truth-in-Lending Law, 
codified as chapter 140C of the General Laws, opted to seek and did 
obtain an exemption. Implementation of the federal Act was achieved 
by extensive and intricate regulations of the Federal Reserve Board 
known as Regulation Z.5 In amending its laws to conform with the 
federal, Massachusetts codified Regulation Z, repeating its provisions 
in several chapters of the General Laws which deal with different 
kinds of credit transactions. 6 In each year since its enactment in 1968, 
the Federal Reserve Board has amended Regulation Z. To maintain 
"substantial similarity" and hence its exemption, it is necessary for 
Massachusetts to amend its statutes annually to conform with the fed-
eral changes. Chapter 802 of the Acts of 1973 and chapter 17 of the 
Acts of 1974 had as their major purpose just that. However, some 
substantive variations from federal law were made. 
Nothing precludes a creditor from applying a periodic rate to un-
paid balances even in a credit transaction which is not strictly open-
ended. Thus the definition of "periodic rate" was amended by chapter 
802 of the Acts of 1973 to remove its limitation to open-end credit 
transactions. 
An amendment to section 7 of chapter 140C requires creditors to so 
disclose if they do not give a rebate or refund of finance charge upon 
prepayment. Since such a refund or rebate is required by law in Mas-
sachusetts, this change has no substantive effect. However, section 7 
was also amended by chapter 713 of the Acts of 1974 to require cred-
itors extending credit in connection with the purchase of a dwelling to 
disclose the total amount of finance charge which will be paid over 
the term of the credit and the total amount the purchaser will be pay-
ing. Not infrequently, long-term home mortgages result in total in-
terest payments which exceed the purchase price of the dwelling. For 
this reason, real estate creditors had been able to have this informa-
tion excepted from the provisions of both the state and federal Acts. 
Certainly an important factor in the decision-making process for a 
consumer wishing to buy a home is what the total cost will be. This al-
lows a realistic comparison of the effect of different rates offered by 
different creditors or over different periods of time. A fraction of a 
per cent difference, which can amount to hundreds or thousands of 
dollars over a long period of time, may seem insignificant while ex-
3 Id. § 1633. 
4 Id. 
5 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1974). 
6 See G.L. cc. l40C, 255B, C, D. 
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pressed as a per cent. 
Depending upon how it is used in practice by mortgage lenders, 
this law ultimately may require greater clarification to achieve its pur-
pose. Two practices used by some banks may not fall within the 
amendment to the statute. In the first such practice, the note is for a 
relatively short period of time, such as five years, even though pay-
ments are scheduled over a longer period such as fifteen or twenty 
years. Technically the note is payable in full at the end of five years, 
putting the lender in the position of requiring a renegotiated loan. 
Revelation of dollar finance charge solely for five years, even though 
the bank obviously intends to allow payment over a much longer time, 
would not give the consumer-borrower adequate information. The 
second practice is the use of a demand note for the early years of the 
loan, such as three years; the note then moves into an installment pay 
plan for the remainder of the term. Again, all payments are 
scheduled over the initially determined longer pay period. A lender 
operating in good faith in these two cases cle'arly would reveal the 
total finance charge in dollars for the entire anticipated pay period. 
Subsection (g) of section 3 of chapter 140C may already cover this 
second practice by providing "that where such an obligation is alterna-
tively payable upon a stated maturity, the stated maturity shall be 
used for the purpose of such computations."7 In the first case the 
creditor may have to label the total finance charge as "estimated" as 
required by subsection (e) of section 5 of chapter 140C since it is 
likely that the rate of finance charge will change at the end of the ini-
tial maturity of the note. 
Minor liberalization of the advertising requirements of section 9 of 
chapter 140C will probably not increase meaningful competitive ad-
vertising of credit terms. While "annual percentage rate" and "finance 
charge" no longer need to stand out more conspicuously than other 
required information, the laundry list of what must be disclosed re-
mains ominous for most creditors. One concession is that simple an-
nual interest which is a component of the finance charge may be 
stated in addition to the annual percentage rate, and a periodic rate 
may be stated in addition to the annual percentage rate, so long as 
neither is more conspicuous than the statement of the annual percent-
age rate. For advertising of open-end credit plans, the advertisement 
does not have to state the conditions under which charges other than 
finance charge will be imposed or the minimum periodic payment 
which must be made. 
Previously it was not clear whether creditors disclosing finance 
charge applicable to a range of balances had to reflect the point at 
which a minimum charge was assessed rather than the charge derived 
7 G.L. c. l40C, § 3(g). 
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from application of a rate in the schedule of such ranges. The 
amendments make it clear that this is not necessary. Further, while 
the fact that minimum charges will be imposed must be disclosed, the 
amendments also make it clear that a creditor need not disclose that 
no minimum charge will be imposed. Probably most creditors would 
want to disclose that fact for competitive reasons. 
Methods for computation of finance charge in open-end credit 
plans are limited to two in Massachusetts.8 Maximum minimum 
charges are also prescribed by law. 9 Still, to conform to federal law, 
section 4 of chapter 140C was amended to include a computational 
method where creditors add some kind of charge during a billing 
cycle for each transaction. 
Periodic statements must be sent to consumers under open-end 
credit plans where there is at least $1.00 balance or a finance charge 
is imposed. An annual percentage rate must be disclosed computed in 
accordance with the provisions of section 4 of chapter 140C. A 
periodic rate must also be disclosed. Multiplying the periodic rate 
times the number of periods in a year, as also required, may not in 
given cases produce the identical annual percentage rate as the actual 
computational method. Some creditors contend that this points up the 
distinction between rate and yield, the latter reflecting what creditors 
actually get in terms of finance charge. In any event, an amendment 
to section 6 of chapter 140C gives creditors options in describing the 
rate produced by the periodic rate times the number of periods. They 
may refer to it as "corresponding annual percentage rate," "corres-
ponding nominal annual percentage rate," "nominal annual percent-
age rate" or "annual percentage rate."10 This probably will not result 
in lucidity for consumers, most of whom will not see or understand 
the distinction. By virtue of the prescribed methods of computation in 
Massachusetts, it is not likely that the distinction will exist in any 
event. 
Finally, section 6 of chapter 140C was amended to allow in periodic 
statements under open-end credit plans itemization of extensions of 
credit, individual credits and individual applications of finance charge, 
and the statement of periodic rates and how the balance is deter-
mined for computing finance charge to appear on the reverse side of 
the statement rather than on its face.U Totals, however, of individual 
entries must appear on the face of the statement. This appears to be a 
clarification rather than a serious substantive change, although the 
expression "separate slips" has been omitted, leaving some doubt as to 
8 Finance charges may be computed by either the adjusted balance method or the av-
erage daily balance method. G.L. c. 255D, § 27C(3); G.L. c. 140C, § 68. 
9 See G.L. c. 140C. 
10 Acts of 1973, c. 802. 
11 ld. 
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whether sales slips and the like evidencing individual transactions will 
any longer suffice. In short, this may require that information con-
cerning each separate transaction must appear on the statement itself 
or on a single statement supplementing the periodic statement. The 
object obviously is to accommodate changing methods employed by 
creditors in producing periodic statements often brought about by 
changes in data processing equipment. It can, however, reduce the 
amount of paper which the consumer must scrutinize. 
"Credit" is defined in section 1 of chapter 140C as "the right 
granted by a creditor to a customer to defer payment of debt, incur 
debt and defer its payment, or purchase property or services and 
defer payment therefor."12 The disclosure requirements of the Act 
are invoked when credit is extended "for which either a finance 
charge is or may be imposed or which, pursuant to an agreement, is 
or may be payable in more than four installments."13 Consumers may 
and frequently do obtain insurance, the premium for which they pay 
in installments. For example, casualty insurance on a dwelling is fre-
quently written under a three-year policy with the premium payable 
in three annual payments. If paid in this way, the premium total is 
usually higher than if paid in one sum for the entire three-year 
period. This in effect is a charge for the privilege of paying in in-
stallments. In insurance premium financing, as regulated by chapter 
255C, an authorized finance charge is usually added to the actual an-
nual amount of the insurance premium. This method is used primar-
ily in payment for automobile insurance. 
What are the consequences if a consumer fails to make an install-
ment payment when due? The usual answer is that although the in-
surer can cancel the insurance coverage, it has no right to enforce 
payment by the consumer for coverage not already extended. If this is 
so, the argument goes, there is no extension of consumer credit and 
hence no requirement for the provider of insurance to comply with 
the disclosure requirements of the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Ap-
peals Court so held in McKinney v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 14 
which involved the sale of automobile insurance whereby the con-
sumer was allowed to pay in nine installments with an additional 
monthly charge of% of 1% (9% annual percentage rate). 
The purpose of the Truth-in-Lending Act is to allow consumers to 
compare through uniform disclosures the costs and terms of credit. 
Since the insurance company was charging additionally for the 
privilege of paying a premium in installments, the purpose of the Act 
would seem to require that full disclosure be made even though tech-
nically there may be no enforceable obligation if the consumer failed 
12 G.L. c. l40C, § 1. 
13 I d. § l (j). 
14 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 679, 682, 303 N.E.2d 853, 856. 
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to make payments. Indeed, it was for this very reason that the Federal 
Reserve Board by regulation, 15 and the Massachusetts General Court 
through chapter 140C,16 required full disclosure in the case of pay-
ment in more than four installments even though ostensibly there was 
no additional finance charge identified as such in the transaction, a 
literal requirement of section 1631 a of the federal Act. 17 This regula-
tion was upheld by the Supreme Court, 18 using language which no 
doubt would uphold a finding that payment for insurance in install-
ments, especially where an additional charge is imposed, would be 
covered by the Act. It would appear, however, that insurance com-
pany interests are prevailing both with the Federal Reserve Board and 
in the courts. 
§14.3. Quality of goods. Consumer advocates have long accused 
manufacturers of electric appliances of employing engineering design 
which makes excessive use of electricity. As both demand for and cost 
of electricity have gone up in the past few years, most strikingly with 
the advent of the "energy crisis," appliances more efficient in their 
energy use have begun to appear on the market, giving some sub-
stance to the accusations. Consumers concerned with the increasing 
cost of electricity and, more broadly, with energy consumption, should 
know what consequences will result from the purchase and use of par-
ticular electric appliances. 
Chapter 891 of the Acts of 1973, amending chapter 94 of the Gen-
eral Laws, requires that information concerning energy consumption 
be contained on labels affixed to "an air conditioner, refrigerator, 
freezer or refrigerator-freezer which is not used or secondhand."1 
The manner in which such information shall be disclosed shall be de-
termined by the secretary of the executive office of consumer affairs 
in conjunction with the director of the division of standards. The sec-
retary is empowered to prescribe what must appear upon the labels in 
terms of energy usage. These labels may be translated into estimated 
dollar cost, or in terms of a formula disclosing efficiency as it relates 
to energy consumption. In addition, the secretary may require on the 
label "a brief description of testing and computation procedures used 
to determine" such information. 2 
In promulgating such regulations, the secretary may divide ap-
pliances into classes and subclasses as to which uniform measurements 
shall be required. He may place upon the "manufacturer, distributor, 
or importer," the burden of testing such appliances to determine the 
15 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1974). 
16 G.L. c. l40C, § 1 (j). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 1631a (1970). 
18 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 ( 1973). 
§14.3. 1 Acts of 1973, c. 891, § 1, adding G.L. c. 94, § 316. 
2 Id. 
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information required on the label, and may suspend the sale in the 
Commonwealth of appliances if test results are not reported as re-
quired or if such results are "determined by the director to be false or 
misleading," the suspension becoming effective not fewer than five 
days after such suspension order.3 The aggrieved party may demand 
a hearing which must be held within 45 days thereafter. The secretary 
may rescind the suspension if the results are forthcoming or they are 
found not to be deceptive or misleading.4 
Unfortunately, the law does not specifically require that such labels 
appear upon floor models or demonstration samples of such ap-
pliances. Thus, if such labels appear only on the appliances contained 
in sealed cartons, the consumer may not acquire the information in 
time for it to be useful. No doubt the secretary can, by regulation, re-
quire that the labels appear upon all new appliances offered for sale. 
Indeed, it would no doubt be an unfair and deceptive practice under 
chapter 93A of the General Laws, the Consumer Protection Act, if 
such labels did not appear. 
The secretary may use an efficiency formula for any appliance 
within a subclass where there is "available accurate and recent infor-
mation concerning the efficiency of at least eighty per cent of the ap-
pliances in said subclass .... "5 While it may be difficult for the con-
sumer to establish whether such information is accurate or not, this 
new law no doubt creates an express warranty under section 2-3136 or 
an implied warranty of merchantability under section 2-314 7 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, chapter 106 of the General Laws. This 
would no doubt invoke the remedies available to a buyer, including 
revocation of acceptance, refund of the purchase price and conse-
quential damages to the extent the warranty was breached or, absent 
revocation, consequential damages in the very least, all as provided in 
sections 2-711 and 2-715 of chapter 106. Section 2-717 would allow 
the consumer to deduct such damages from that portion of the price 
he has not yet paid to a seller. For example, if a consumer deter-
mined that an appliance was using 20 per cent more electricity than 
that indicated on the label, the cost of that electricity projected over 
the normal use and life of the appliance might well be deducted from 
the price as consequential damages. In addition, a consumer could 
probably invoke the remedies of chapter 93A, giving a thirty-day 
notice requesting an offer of settlement before pursuing the matter in 
court. In this case the remedies of the Uniform Commercial Code are 
more efficient, but since the legal theories are different, one remedy 
3 ld., adding G.L. c. 94, § 317 . 
• ld. 
5 Id. 
"G.L. c. 106, § 2-313. 
7 ld. § 2-314. 
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need not be elected to the exclusion of the other. 
Until January 1, 1975, the legislation allowed industry to rate and 
label the affected appliances voluntarily. Only thereafter was the sec-
retary empowered to invoke his regulatory authority. At this writing 
nothing had occurred in either direction except that manufacturers 
had arrived at an Energy Efficiency Rating for air conditioners. With-
out a concerted effort by industry or government or both to inform 
consumers of the meaning of such ratings, they will have little impact. 
Section 2-316A of chapter 106 was added in 1970 to make it clear 
that sellers by "boiler-plate" clauses and forms could not disclaim or 
modify the warranties implied by law, those of merchantability and 
fitness for particular purpose. That section also preserved for buyers 
of consumer goods their remedies under the Uniform Commercial 
Code in spite of any other remedies a seller may wish to offer. How-
ever, sections 1-1028 and 1-1079 had led some sellers or their counsel 
to think that buyers could by another clause in a form waive the 
"nonwaiver" provisions of new section 2-316A, contrary to the obvious 
intent of the legislature. Rather than allow the matter to be subjected 
to protracted litigation, the General Court enacted chapter 799 of the 
Acts of 1973 which amended section 2-316A to provide that "[t]he 
provisions of this section may not be disclaimed or waived by 
agreement."10 
§ 14.4. Rate setting commission. In 1956 the General Court es-
tablished a board of rate setting1 to determine and set rates for conva-
lescent nursing and rest homes. In 1968, the General Court abolished 
the board of rate setting and established in its place a rate setting 
commission with greatly expanded regulatory powers. The new com-
mission had 
the sole responsibility for establishing fair and reasonable rates of 
payments to be used by governmental units, including the division 
of industrial accidents in the department of labor and industries, 
and for establishing fair and reasonable charges to be used by 
state institutions for general health supplies, care, services and 
accommodations. 2 
During the 1973 legislative session the General Court once again 
overhauled the statutory provisions establishing the rate setting com-
mission by enacting chapter 1229 of the Acts of 1973, which reor-
8 Id. §. 1-102. 
9 Id. § 1-107. 
10 Acts of 1973, c. 799, § l. 
§14.4 'G.L. c. 7, § 30L. 
2 G.L. c. 7, § 30L, repealed by Acts of 1973, c. 1229, § 4. The substance of the section 
is now contained in G.L. c. 6A, § 32. 
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ganizes the rate setting commission, provides for a consumer advisory 
council, and requires the establishment of rates for providers of 
health and other services. The sections governing the operation of the 
commission have been moved from chapter 7 of the General Laws to 
chapter 6A (Executive Offices), and the commission itself is now 
under the jurisdiction of the executive office of human services. Only 
a new division of hearings officers remains within the jurisdiction of 
the executive office of administration and finance. 
The new sections of chapter 6A will now be analyzed and compared 
to the old law relating to the rate setting commission, highlighting the 
major revisions. 
Section 31.3 This is a definitional section which remains essentially 
the same. The only changes are that the definition of "general health 
supplies, care, services and accommodations" has been changed to 
"general health supplies, care, social rehabilitative or educational serv-
ices and accommodations" and was expanded specifically to cover "in-
stitutions including those providing treatment, training, instruction 
and care of children and adults."4 The revision seems to reflect the 
more progressive approach the Commonwealth is taking in providing 
services under programs directed by the office of human services. 
Section 32.5 This section revises to a significant extent the structure 
and organization of the commission as it formerly existed pursuant to 
chapter 6, section 30D of the General Laws. The commission now 
consists of three members appointed by the governor with the advice 
of the secretary of the executive office of human services for terms of 
three years. Prior to the enactment of chapter 1229, the commission 
consisted of five members appointed to five year terms whose chair-
man was the commissioner of administration and finance. Under the 
new statute, the chairmanship has become a full-time job, requiring 
administrative experience and an advanced degree in business ad-
ministration, public administration, or law. One of the remaining 
members must be a certified public accountant, while the other mem-
bers must have experience in the field of medical economics, and 
both, like the chairman, must devote full time to their duties and 
avoid participation in any activity which may give rise to a conflict of 
interest. Other new provisions prohibit more than two commissioners 
being from the same political party, and require a detailed annual re-
port to the secretary of the executive office of human services and the 
General Court. 
Each commissioner receives an annual salary of $30,000, as opposed 
to a former per diem rate of $50. The upgrading of the salaries, the 
3 G.L. c. 6A, § 31. The former definitional section was G.L. c. 7, § 30K. 
4 G.L. c. 6A, § 31. 
5 The precursor of§ 32 was G.L. c. 7, § 30L. 
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full-time requirement, and the qualifications for appointment all re-
flect the increased need for and importance of an efficient and pro-
fessional decision-making body in the area of rate regulation. 
The third paragraph of section 32 sets forth the duties of the rate 
setting commission. It requires, inter alia, that the commission: 
(1} shall determine, after public hearing, at least as often as annu-
ally, the rates to be paid by each governmental unit to providers 
of health care, social, rehabilitative or educational services and ac-
commodations; (2) shall determine, after public hearing, at least 
as often as annually, the rates to be charged by each state institu-
tion for general health supplies, care, social, rehabilitative or edu-
cational services and accommodations; (3) shall certify to each af-
fected governmental unit the rates so determined; (4) shall de-
termine, after public hearing, at least as often as annually, and 
certify to the division of industrial accidents of the department of 
labor and industries rates of payment for general health supplies, 
care, social, rehabilitative or educational services and accommoda-
tions, which rates shall be paid for services under the workmen's 
compensation act; (5) shall upon request of the commissioner of 
insurance assist him in performance of his duties as set forth in 
[G.L. c. 176B, § 4]; (6) may establish for rest homes, nursing 
homes and convalescent homes, fair and reasonable classifications 
upon which any rates may be based. 6 
Section 32 then continues with a new section which spells out the 
procedures to be utilized by the commission and providers of services 
in determining and petitioning for rates, including a provision for es-
tablishing interim rates. Rates must be established on a prospective 
basis subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the commission. 
Providers have the right to petition the commission for an increase in 
an interim rate at any time, provided certain requirements are met, 
including an independent audit of the petitioner's accounts, unless 
waived by the commission. Before the interim rate determination is 
made, the director of the appropriate bureau must report in writing 
his recommendations to the commission and to the petitioner, follow-
Ing which the petitioner has a ten-day period to file objections, argu-
ments and comments to the commission. Once an interim rate is filed 
with the state secretary and becomes effective, no appeal is allowed. 
A preliminary final rate is calculated after receipt by the commis-
sion of a satisfactory financial and operating cost report from a pro-
vider of services or state institution, attested to by a licensed or cer-
tified public accountant. Again, no appeal is allowed from a prelimi-
nary final rate. Ninety per cent of the difference between the interim 
a G.L. c. 6A, § 32. 
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rate and the preliminary final rate becomes payable by or to govern-
mental units when certified to the state secretary. 
The preliminary final rate may be promulgated as the final rate if 
the commission is satisfied with the provider's report. In the event 
that a final rate is determined without a field audit, the commission 
shall institute random field audits to ensure accurate reporting. If the 
commission is not satisfied with a provider's report, it can promulgate, 
within six months, a different rate of payment. Any person aggrieved 
by any rate determination, except as otherwise provided, has a right 
of appeal pursuant to section 36.7 
Section 33. 8 This section reorganizes the bureaus within the commis-
sion. It replaces the bureau of hospitals, sanatoria, and infirmaries, 
and the bureau of convalescent, nursing and rest homes by "such 
bureaus as may be necessary to carry out its duties as set forth in the 
chapter, including but not limited to a bureau of hospital and clinics, 
a bureau of long-term care facilities, a bureau of community and 
home health agencies, a bureau of non-institutional medical providers 
and a bureau of educational and social services."9 Each bureau will 
now be under the direction of a full-time director. 
The commission will continue to appoint an executive secretary. 
The remainder of section 33 further defines civil service status con-
cerning appointments and transfers, mandates cooperation and ex-
changes of information between the commission and governmental 
units, and permits the examination by the commission of books and 
accounts kept by governmental units. 
Section 34. This is an entirely new section which reflects the 
legislature's recognition of the necessity and utility of consumer input 
in rate regulation by establishing an advisory council to the commis-
sion. Members of the council are the chairman of the commission, the 
commissioner of the department of public welfare, the commissioner 
of the department of public health, the commissioner of education, 
the secretaries of the executive offices of elder affairs, human serv-
ices, and administration and finance, and sixteen members to be ap-
pointed by the commission for terms of three years. The appointed · 
members are to be evenly split between provider representatives and 
consumer advocates. The second paragraph of the section spells out 
in greater detail the qualifications and restrictions upon these ap-
pointments. 
The council must meet at least three times a year or upon the call 
of the chairman or on written application to the chairman by any 
7 The remainder of section 32 merely repeats the final two paragraphs of former 
G.L. c. 7, § 30L. 
8 The precursor of§ 33 was G.L. c. 7, §30M. 
9 G.L. c. 6A, § 33. 
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eight members. Each year a chairman is elected from among the con-
sumer representatives, subcommittees are appointed for each bureau 
established pursuant to section 33, and recommendations can be made 
on matters of policy and operation of the commissions and its 
bureaus. Bureau directors and subcommittees are to advise and con-
sult one another. Subcommittees report to the council following each 
meeting, and the council takes final action on all matters coming be-
fore it and on any requests or recommendations of a subcommittee. 
The important role of the advisory council is made quite clear in 
the last paragraph of the section. It gives the council broad powers to 
advise on the overall operation and policy of the commission and its 
bureaus, and to consider any item recommended by the commission, 
the council chairman, a majority of the council, or a bureau subcom-
mittee. Most significantly, the council has the right to at least sixty 
days prior review and comment on any proposed rule or regulation of 
the commission or any of its bureaus, with the exception of 
emergency regulations. Finally, the council must be notified at least 
ten days in advance of any public hearing or meeting scheduled by 
the commission or any of its bureaus. 
Section 35. This section is a word for word restatement of former 
section 30N of chapter 7. It sets conditions upon which payments are 
made to providers (examination and filing requirements) and pro-
vides for fines, court orders, and license suspension when a provider 
fails to comply with these requirements. 
Section 36. This section sets forth the procedures for appeal and 
judicial review, most of which remain essentially as formerly pro-
vided in chapter 7, section 300. All appeals from an interim or final 
rate established by the commission are, within thirty days after the 
rate is filed with the state secretary, to be filed with the division of 
hearings officer established by section 4H of chapter 7 in the execu-
tive office of administration and finance. 10 The rate determined on 
appeal must be adequate, fair and reasonable, and based, among 
other things, on the costs of the provider. The appeal is conducted as 
an adjudicatory proceeding under chapter 30A, and the decision of 
the division must be filed with the commission and the state secretary 
within thirty days of the conclusion of the hearing. 
The division's decision must contain a statement of reasons for the 
decision, including a determination of each issue of fact or law on 
which the decision was based. If a decision results in a recommenda-
tion of a rate different from that certified, the commission shall estab-
lish a new rate. If the commission determines that the statement of 
reasons is inadequate, it may remand for further investigation. The 
superior court for the county of Suffolk is given exclusive jurisdiction 
10 See text at note 13 infra. 
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over all appeals from decisions of the commission. An aggrieved party 
must file such appeal within thirty days of the receipt of a decision. 
The appeal is in the form of a petition for review. Furthermore, a 
provider is given aggrieved party status when a remand does not re-
sult in final decision by the commission within 21 days of the date of 
remand. 
The petition is to set forth the grounds upon which the decision 
should be set aside. The division and all the parties to the appeal are 
to be notified by sending a copy of the petition within seven days of 
its filing. The division is to file the original or a certified copy of the 
record under review with the court within forty days of the filing of 
the petition. The court has broad discretion to affirm, modify, set 
aside, remand or enter any other appropriate order. While the peti-
tion is being considered, the commission may grant temporary relief 
or, with the consent of the parties, informally adjust or settle the con-
troversy. Judicial review is governed by the state administrative pro-
cedure act11 to the extent it is not inconsistent with section 36. 
A new and significant feature of the reorganization of the rate set-
ting commission is the establishment of a division of hearings officers 
to hear all appeals. 12 The division is within the executive office of 
administration and finance, separating it from the commission and 
the executive office of human services. The secretary of administra-
tion and finance appoints the chief hearings officer, who must be (1) 
a resident of the state, (2) an experienced trial attorney, (3) able to 
devote full time to his duties, and (4) free from having any financial 
interest in any provider. The chief is to organize the division, establish 
policies, and employ other hearing officers who shall be members of 
the bar and have trial experience. 
The division has subpoena power and may apply for an order to 
any justice of the superior court to compel the attendance of sum-
moned witnesses. In addition, the division has the subpoena power 
provided pursuant to adjudicatory hearings authorized under the 
state administrative procedure act. 13 
The remainder of chapter 1229 of the Acts of 1973 includes mostly 
technical and corrective provisions. Section 4 repeals sections 30 K to 
30P of chapter 7, the former enabling statute. Sections 4A through 
4 T merely note the change from chapter 7 to chapter 6A. Section 5 
exempts colleges, universities and other programs under the direction 
of the department of education from the Act. Sections 6 and 7 set 
forth the lengths of the initial terms of the commissioners and the ad-
visory council members. Sections 8 and 9 deal with civil service mat-
11 G.L. c. 30A, § 14. 
12 G.L. c. 7, § 4H. 
13 G.L. c. 30A, § 12. 
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ters, including tenure and examinations. Section IO provides for a 
smooth transition from the rate setting commission established prior 
to chapter I229 and the new commission established as of July I, 
I974. Custody of all property is transferred; established rates and 
regulations remain in full force and effect until changed, as do exist-
ing contract, leases and obligations. Section II is a severability clause. 
Section I2 states that for one year from the effective date of this Act14 
the term "general health supplies, care, social, rehabilitative, or educa-
tional services and accommodations" shall not include any services and 
accommodations rates of payment which were not subject to approval 
by the former rate setting commission, except those provided by 
home care agencies purchased by the executive office of elder affairs. 
Thus, the reorganization of the rate setting commission accom-
plished by chapter I229 represents a significant improvement in 
health provider rate regulation. 15 The commission itself has become 
more professionalized, the scope of regulation somewhat broadened, 
the regulatory process streamlined, and most importantly from the 
public's viewpoint, consumer input into the regulatory scheme has 
been increased. 
§14.5. Home mortgages. The year I974 saw the housing con-
struction industry reach its lowest ebb since World War II. Money for 
home mortgages became increasingly scarce as the prime lending rate 
rose to I2% and higher. The General Court took two important steps 
during the closing days of the I974 session to increase the funds avail-
able for home mortgages in an effort to help out a declining industry 
as well as those attempting to purchase their own homes. 
Chapter 843 of the Acts of I974 loosens some of the statutory re-
strictions imposed on the borrowing power of these institutions. Sec-
tion 66 of chapter I68 of the General Laws, regulating savings banks, 
is amended in the following specific ways: (I) money may now be bor-
rowed for a period or periods aggregating up to I5 years (the former 
limit was IO years); (2) the aggregate of all borrowing allowed to be 
outstanding at any one time has been increased from five to ten per 
cent of the deposits shown on the books of the corporation; (3) the 
restrictions upon the sources from which a savings bank can borrow 
money have been abolished (formerly, the borrowing had to be from 
an institution regulated by state or federal authorities; this conceivably 
14 The effective date of Acts of 1973, c. 1229 is July 1, 1974. Id. § 13. 
15 It seems unlikely that chapter 1229 will be the last word in health regulation reor-
ganization since the following nonbinding question put forward on the ballot in the 
1974 general election was answered in the affirmative: Should the General Court enact 
legislation during the 1975 session reorganizing state government by creating a De-
partment of Health Systems Regulation which shall have the power to administer the 
medicaid program; control and set rates for nursing homes, hospitals, and other health 
providers under medicaid; license and inspect health facilities; and regulate private 
health insurance policies, medical and hospital service plans? 
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empowers savings banks to borrow from private sources and govern-
mental agencies); (4) most importantly, the commissioner of banks 
may by order or regulation authorize savings banks to borrow money 
in such amounts and upon such terms as he or she deems consistent 
with safe and sound banking practice. 
Sections 3 and 4 of chapter 843 of the Acts of 1974 are mirror pro-
visions enabling savings banks and cooperative banks to issue se-
curities representing units of interest in specific mortgage loans or 
pools of mortgage loans; in connection with these securities, they may 
enter into agreements including provisions for guaranteeing collection 
or payment of the principal and interest on the securities. Further-
more, the commissioner is given regulatory power to govern the terms 
and conditions of their issuance. 
Chapter 846 of the Acts of 1974 establishes a Massachusetts Home 
Mortgage Finance Agency (MHMFA). The original intent of this bill 
was to create a neighborhood stabilization and home improvement 
program to assist home ownership, an intent which remains evident in 
the law finally enacted which encompasses an even broader scope. 
Mortgages covered by this law include those upon 
real property . . . improved by a residential building or unim-
proved if the proceeds of such loan shall be used for the purpose 
of erecting, acquiring or rehabilitating, including home improve-
ment loans, a residential building thereon; or for the purpose of 
purchasing a condominium unit or a cooperative share in a resi-
dential condominium or cooperative provided that each mortgage 
loan made from the proceeds of a loan made by MHMFA to such 
mortgage lender shall be made to an owner-occupant .... 1 
Section 2 is a declaration of public necessity, enumerating problems 
of rising costs, inadequate housing, decay of existing housing stock, 
and the necessity of new construction and rehabilitation. The legisla-
ture found that the major cause of the housing crisis is the lack of 
funds at interest rates which low and moderate income persons can 
afford; to remedy these conditions, a corporate agency of the Com-
monwealth is created to raise funds from private investors in order to 
make those funds available through mortgage lending institutions for 
new residential mortgage loans to low and moderate income persons 
and families, to insure such new residential mortgage loans, and to 
provide technical assistance to low income persons and families desir-
ing such new residential mortgage loans. 2 
Section 3 creates the MHMF A within the department of community 
affairs. It consists of the commissioners of community affairs and cor-
§14.5. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 846, § 1. 
2 ld. § 2. 
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porations and taxation, the chairman of the Massachusetts Housing 
Finance Agency (MHF A) (who also serves as chairman of the 
MHMF A), and four persons to be appointed by the governor for 
terms of seven years. The executive director of the MHFA will also 
serve as the chief executive officer of the MHMFA. 
A very broad general grant of powers is authorized by section 4. 
Among the twenty provisions listed is the power to make loans to 
mortgage lenders, contract with the MHF A, invest funds, borrow 
money, foreclose, procure insurance, make and publish rules and 
regulations, and do any and all things necessary or convenient to 
carry out the purposes of and exercise the powers expressly given and 
granted by the Act. 
The heart of the Act controlling loans to mortgage lenders is set 
out in section 5. Pursuant to its regulatory authority, the MHMF A is 
to effectuate the purposes of the Act and the following specific objec-
tives: (1) to expand the supply of funds in the Commonwealth avail-
able for new residential mortgages; (2) to provide the additional hous-
ing needed to remedy the shortage of adequate housing in the Com-
monwealth and to eliminate the existence of a large number of sub-
standard dwellings; and (3) to encourage the effective participation by 
mortgage lenders in the program authorized by this Act and the re-
striction of the financial return and benefit thereto from such pro-
gram to that which is necessary and reasonable to induce such 
participation. 3 
The section also places further restrictions on loans made for re-
habilitation of multiple dwelling units so as to minimize residential 
displacement, limit rent increases and notify each tenant residing in 
the dwelling of the repairs or improvements to be undertaken. 
District courts and housing courts are granted original jurisdiction 
over proceedings contesting rehabilitation under section 5 and are au-
thorized to issue declaratory judgments to the same extent as that of 
the superior court pursuant to chapter 231 A of the General Laws. 
The major thrust toward rehabilitation in the Act is set out in this 
section. "MHMF A shall set requirements on participating mortgage 
lenders so that at least eighty per cent of the bond proceeds shall be 
for new residential mortgages on structures at least ten years old."4 In 
this same vein, the MHMF A can approve neighborhood preservation 
programs proposed by cities and towns. 
Section 6 empowers the agency to establish a mortgage insurance 
program to insure loans made by mortgage lenders, subject to regula-
tions prepared by the Commissioner of Insurance. Section 7 allows 
the MHMF A to contract with nonprofit organizations or qualified 
3 Id. § 5. 
'Id. 
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public agencies for technical assistance to potential borrowers. Such 
services include, among other things, consultation on construction, 
rehabilitation, laws, financing and management. 
Section 7 A creates a Resident Ownership Fund set up specifically as 
a subsidy program to assist low income families or persons and to 
provide them with special advice and assistance. 
Section 8 authorizes the MH MFA to issue negotiable bonds and 
notes and places conditions thereon; no bond shall mature more than 
fifty years from the date of its issue; the aggregate principal amount 
outstanding at any one time shall not exceed 25 million dollars. Sec-
tion 9 states the bonds and notes shall not constitute a debt of the 
Commonwealth, but shall be payable solely from the proceeds of loans 
made under this Act, reserve funds created therefor by the agency, 
and other available funds of the MHMF A. 
A Capital Reserve Fund is created by section 10 to be used solely 
for the payment of the principal or annual sinking fund payment of 
bonds of the MHMFA as they mature or become due, the purchase of 
bonds of the agency, and the payment of interest or redemption pre-
miums on such bonds. In the discretion of the agency, pursuant to 
section 12, the bonds and notes shall be secured by a trust agreement 
by and between the agency and a trustee, which may be any trust 
company or bank within the Commonwealth possessing the powers of 
a trust company.5 Because the MHMFA is deemed to be performing 
an essential governmental function, section 12 exempts their bonds 
and notes from taxation. Finally, section 13 provides that the bonds 
and notes be made securities eligible for investment. 
Sections 14 through 16 of chapter 846 call for the Massachusetts 
Housing Finance Agency Advisory Committee to assist the MHMFA 
in formulating policies, 6 the submission of an annual report/ and the 
inspection of books and records. 8 Section 17 provides for a liberal 
construction of the law, and section 18 is a severability clause. 
Chapter 846 could well turn out to be one of the most significant 
statutes passed by the General Court in 1974. There is no question 
that such an agency is needed and that there is much benefit to be 
derived from rehabilitating old neighborhoods rather than inviting 
the environmental consequences of building new ones. Unfortunately, 
as of this writing, the General Court has not appropriated any funds 
for the new agency, and increasing fiscal restraint may operate to 
limit whatever moneys are forthcoming. The governor has just re-
cently appointed the members of the MHMFA, and hopefully the 
agency can begin operations and start to fulfill its potential during 
1975. 
5 See generally G.L. c. 172. 
6 Acts of 1974, c. 846, § 14. 
1 ld. § 15. 
8 Id. § 16. 
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§14.6. Administrative remedies: Chapter 93A. Chapter 939 of 
the Acts of 1973 has added three new paragraphs to the civil rem-
edies section of chapter 93A. 1 The introduction of this bill was a di-
rect result of the decision handed down the previous year by the Su-
preme Judicial Court in Gordon v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. 2 which 
held that administrative remedies must be exhausted before bringing 
action under chapter 93A for relief from an alleged unfair act or 
practice. 3 Consumer advocates were dismayed by the decision and felt 
that it was contrary to and inconsistent with the intent of the General 
Court. That intent, they believed, was to provide broad, efficient and 
expeditious relief in the courts, and was not intended to require the 
initial exhaustion of administrative remedies, real or possible, for acts 
not expressly permitted by such laws or even for conduct expressly 
prohibited by such laws, absent a clear provision in those laws requir-
ing the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 4 Gordon made available 
the defense of exhaustion of administrative remedies to almost any 
respondent whose business was regulated by any local, state, or fed-
eral agency, and effectively barred a petitioner from continuing an ac-
tion in the superior court for damages and equitable relief. Adminis-
trative remedies could lengthen the delay a consumer already faced in 
having his or her grievances redressed and, in many instances, an 
administrative or regulatory agency is restricted by statute in ordering 
appropriate relief. Against this background chapter 939 was drafted 
and enacted. 
New subsection (6) of section 9 of chapter 93A states that "any per-
son entitled to bring an action under this section shall not be required 
to initiate, pursue or exhaust any remedy established by any regula-
tion, administrative procedure, local, state or federal law ... in order 
to bring an action under this section .... "5 Furthermore, the subsec-
tion explicitly states that failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
shall not be a defense under section 9, except as provided in subsec-
tion (7). 
Suspension of court proceedings are permissible under conditions 
narrowly circumscribed by subsection (7). This may be done upon mo-
tion by the respondent before the time for answering and after a 
hearing to permit the respondent to initiate action naming the 
petitioner as a party before an appropriate regulatory board or officer 
providing adjudicatory hearings. Although the statute does not ex-
plicitly so indicate, only adjudicatory hearings as defined in chapter 
§ 14.6. I G.L. c. 93A, § 9. 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 281 N.E.2d 573. 
3 Id. at 762, 281 N.E.2d at 577. See G.L. c. 93A, § 2. 
4 G.L. c. 93A, § 2(b). See Rice, Remedies for Consumers: The Amendment of Chap-
ter 93A, 54 Mass. L.Q. 307 (1969); Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedure and the 
Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U .L. Rev. 559 (1969). 
5 G.L. c. 93A, § 9(6). 
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30A of the General Laws6 could meet the requirements of this section. 
Furthermore, the respondent's evidence must indicate that there is 
substantial likelihood that final action by the court favorable to the 
petitioner would require the respondent to undertake practices incon-
sistent with a lawful regulatory scheme, or that the regulatory board 
or officer has a substantial interest in the matter and has substantial 
power to provide the relief sought. 
Judicial proceedings may only be suspended on the ground that 
administrative remedies have not been exhausted when a regulatory 
scheme would be disrupted, or if a regulatory board has a substantial 
interest in the matter and can substantially provide the petitioner with 
the relief he seeks. 
The final paragraph of subsection (7) enables the court, upon sus-
pension of the proceeding, to enter any interlocutory or temporary 
orders it deems necessary and proper, or appropriate to maintain the 
status quo between the parties. If the court finds that the administra-
tive proceeding is unreasonably delayed or prejudicial to a party, or 
that final action has not been taken within six months of the order 
suspending the judicial proceedings, it shall terminate the suspension 
and bring the matter forward for trial. 
Finally, subsection (8) states that recovering or failing to recover 
damages or other relief in any administrative or judicial proceeding, 
except proceedings authorized under section 9 of chapter 93A, shall 
not be a bar to or a limitation upon relief authorized under section 9. 
The language indicates that civil remedies under the Consumer Pro-
tection Act may be sought even though a claimant has sought other 
administrative remedies or has pursued litigation. Hence, it may be 
possible for a litigant who has recovered damages in a suit brought 
pursuant to another section of the General Laws to bring an action 
under chapter 93A, section 9 to recover double or treble damages, 
court costs, and attorney's fees, provided that the litigant can allege an 
unfair or deceptive practice. 
6 "Adjudicatory proceeding" means a proceeding before an agency in which the 
legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named persons are required by con-
stitutional right or by any provision of the General Laws to be determined after 
opportunity for an agency hearing. Without enlarging the scope of this definition, 
adjudicatory proceeding does not include (a) proceedings solely to determine 
whether the agency shall institute or recommend institution of proceedings in a 
court; or (b) proceedings for the arbitration of labor disputes voluntarily submitted 
by the parties to such disputes; or (c) proceedings for the disposition of grievances 
of employees of the commonwealth; or (d) proceedings to classify or reclassify, or 
to allocate or reallocate, appointive offices and positions in the government of the 
commonwealth; or (e) proceedings to determine the equalized valuations of the 
several cities and towns; or (j) proceedings for the determination of wages under 
[G.L. c. 121, § 26T]. 
G.L. c. 30A, § 1(1). 
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In conclusion, chapter 939 of the Acts of 1973 virtually eliminates 
the judicially imposed requirement that any person seeking judicial re-
lief under chapter 93A must first seek any possibly availing adminis-
trative remedies before commencing a chapter 93A suit. It reaffirms 
the original intent of the legislature that the civil remedies of chapter 
93A constituted an independent, statutory cause of action not barred 
merely because other relief could have been sought. 
§14.7. Prompt payment of medical benefits. Chapters 176A and 
176B of the General Laws govern the organization and conduct of 
nonprofit hospital and medical service corporations in the Common-
wealth, such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Pursuant to these chapters, 
such corporations are authorized to issue subscription certificates to 
their subscribers. No subscription certificate can be issued unless the 
Commissioner of Insurance has approved in writing the form of the 
certificate. 
Section 8 of chapter 176A and section 6 of chapter 176B further 
prescribe certain provisions which must be contained in all subscrip-
tion certificates. These provisions relate to such items as the length of 
the agreement, the terms and conditions upon which it may be ex-
tended, renewed or terminated, and the grace period allowed for 
making any payment due. Chapter 732 of the Acts of 1974 amends 
those sections by placing additional requirements on the issuer of sub-
scription certificates. The amendment establishes steps which a chap-
ter 176A or 176B corporation must take upon receiving notice for di-
rect payments of benefits from a subscriber. First, it must furnish the 
subscriber with forms which the subscriber can fill out and return. 
Second, the corporation must use the information provided on the 
forms to make a determination of the subscriber's right to payment. 
Third, within forty-five days of receiving the completed forms, the 
corporation must either (1) pay the subscriber, (2) notify the sub-
scriber of the reason for nonpayment, or (3) request in writing addi-
tional information from the subscriber. 
Hopefully chapter 732 will correct some of the abuses that existed 
in this area, such as the remissness with which some payments were 
made or the inability of the subscriber to ascertain the reason for 
nonpayment. The new law is in some respects quite similar to the er-
roneous billing statute. 1 Section 5 of that law2 requires a creditor, 
upon the opening of an account and at not less than two quarterly in-
tervals during each year, to provide the customer with a written notice 
setting forth his rights under section 2 of the statute. These amend-
ments to chapters 176A and 176B of the General Laws are expected 
to provide subscribers to hospital and medical service plans with the 
§14.7. I G.L. c. 93C. 
2 Id. § 5. 
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necessary information to facilitate and accelerate the payment of these 
benefits. 
§14.8. Small claims trial bond. Chapter 166 of the Acts of 1974 
makes a minor corrective change in the Commonwealth's small claims 
laws. Section 23 of chapter 218 of the General Laws had been sub-
stantially rewritten by section 2 of chapter 748 of the Acts of 1973 to 
correct some of the abuses that previously existed in small claims pro-
cedure. For example, although defendants were once able to remove 
a cause of action to the superior court, chapter 748 provided that 
every cause of action commenced in the district court must now ini-
tially be determined in the district court. 1 
Prior to 1973, a party could file a claim for a jury trial any time 
prior to the day upon which he or she was notified to appear. Such a 
claim was to be accompanied by an affidavit specifying that there were 
questions of fact requiring trial and that such trial was intended in 
good faith, together with the sum of five dollars for the entry of the 
cause in superior court. In addition, the claimant was required to se-
cure a bond in the penal sum of one hundred dollars, with such 
surety or sureties as may be approved by the plaintiff or a clerk of the 
district court, payable to the other party or parties to the cause, con-
ditioned to satisfy any judgment which might be entered against him 
in the superior court. 
Chapter 748 of the Acts of 1973 changed this by allowing the de-
fendant, within ten days after the receipt of the district court's find-
ing, to file a claim of trial by jury, again accompanied by an affidavit 
and a five dollar entry fee. Under this chapter, however, the required 
bond was to be in the amount of the judgment in the district court, 
rather than a flat one hundred dollars. Chapter 166 of the Acts of 
1974 struck the requirement that the bond be in the amount of the 
judgment in the district court, and reinserted the old standard that 
the bond be in the penal sum of one hundred dollars, with such 
surety or sureties as may be approved by the plaintiff or the clerk or 
an assistant clerk of the district court. The amendment appears to be 
merely corrective, ostensibly facilitating administration, and reflects a 
determination that one hundred dollars is a fair and sufficient 
amount. 
§14.9. Legislation: Miscellaneous. 
Disclosure in selling motor vehicles and funeral services. Chapter 619 of 
the Acts of 1974 requires that "[a)ny motor vehicle dealer advertising 
the price of vehicles shall include all charges of any type, except taxes, 
and shall include, without limitation, any charges for freight, handling 
or preparation necessary or usual prior to delivery to the consumer."1 
§14.8. I G.L. c. 218, § 23. 
§14.9. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 619, adding G.L. c. 93B, § 5A. 
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Thus the asterisk next to a quoted price referring to an obscure 
statement that such charges are extra will either disappear, or those 
charges will have to appear in such statement. One alternative, of 
course, is for the quoted price to include all such charges; no doubt 
wise dealers will put this to good advantage by proclaiming "price all-
inclusive" or "no extra charges." A clear implication of the statute is 
that if such charges are not disclosed in the advertisement, they may 
not be assessed against a buyer. At the least, nondisclosure would con-
stitute an unfair and deceptive practice under chapter 93A of the 
General Laws, giving the buyer the remedies provided in that chapter. 
Regulations promulgated under that chapter define "advertising" to 
include just about any public statement, oral or visual. 2 This means 
that signs in windows, display rooms and on vehicles themselves must 
contain the charges which are added to the price. 
The statute does not apply to advertisements by manufacturers. 
Thus, they may continue to advertise a price on television, "tagging" 
at the end of the commercial in rapid narration "freight, handling 
and dealer prep extra." They may do the same in printed advertise-
ments. When, however, such ads are run in connection with dealers 
within the Commonwealth, the statute would apply and require dis-
closure of those charges. 
At times of bereavement, friends or relatives making funeral ar-
rangements are usually not in an appropriate emotional or mental 
state to inquire of options open to them in. funeral services and their 
respective costs. Chapter 688 of the Acts of 1974 requires cemetery 
corporations to disclose or to cause the funeral director designated by 
a representative of the deceased to disclose three options available at 
the cemetery in the course of burial if such options exist: services 
within a chapel, gravesite services with observation of the lowering of 
a casket, and services without such observation. Noncomplying ceme-
tery corporations are subject to a fine of $100 to $500. 
Honesty in the market place. Merchants who short weight or over-
charge buyers are subject to fines under section 177 of chapter 94 of 
the General Laws. Such acts occur when the merchant (a) gives a false 
or insufficient weight or measure, (b) quotes a price which indicates a 
weight or measure in excess of that actually received, or (c) demands 
or accepts payment of a price in excess of a quoted selling price based 
upon a weight or measure. Similar penalties apply to a buyer who 
provides a measuring device in such a manner to achieve more than 
he is entitled to at the agreed price. Section 177 of chapter 94 for-
merly provided penalties of $50 for a first offense, $200 for a second 
offense, and $50 and imprisonment for from one to three months for 
a subsequent offense. Chapter 115 of the Acts of 1974 amends section 
177 to increase the penalties to maximums of $250 for a first offense 
2 Regulations of the Attorney General pursuant to G.L. c. 93A, § 2(c). 
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and $500 plus imprisonment for from one to six months for a subse-
quent offense committed within two years of the first. The object, ob-
viously, is one of deterrence. 
Anti-burglary measure. It is axiomatic that burglars who intend to 
convert their loot into cash must have someone or some place by 
which to do so. Pawnbrokers, even though legitimate, are frequently 
the outlets for stolen goods since in most cases they have no way of 
determining that the goods are stolen. If such goods are discovered 
and identified by police, insurance companies or owners, pawnbrokers 
must give them up. The thieves, however, often go unapprehended. 
To deter the pawning of stolen goods and aid in apprehension of 
thieves, chapter 238 of the Acts of 1974 requires pawnbrokers to 
photograph every person pawning goods and to keep such photo-
graphs. 
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